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FORGOTTEN BUT NOT FORGIVEN: REMEDIES FOR STUDENT 
LOAN DEBTORS IN PUBLIC SERVICE
Andrew Goring*
Abstract
This Note identifies a timely issue with student loans and discusses 
potential remedies. Under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program,
borrowers of federal student loans who make 120 qualifying monthly 
payments while working in public service may have their loans forgiven.
When a loan is forgiven, the borrower no longer has to pay the remaining 
balance of the debt. Since both the prevalence of student loans and the 
average student debt are increasing, loan forgiveness is an important 
opportunity for borrowers under the crushing debt of student loans. 
However, a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau report found a rising
problem: Loan servicers are leading borrowers to believe that borrowers’ 
monthly payments qualify for loan forgiveness, when they in fact do not. 
Right now, the only solution for those borrowers is to restart the clock on 
their ten years of public service. This Note determines that there are 
several causes of action that could be brought against student loan 
servicers in order to offer relief to borrowers who believed their loans 
would be forgiven.
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INTRODUCTION
The Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program was introduced 
as part of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act1 in 2007.2 The 
concept behind PSLF is simple: A student loan borrower who works in 
public service for ten years3 can get his student loans discharged.4
October 1, 2017, marked ten years from the first qualifying payments for 
PSLF,5 so borrowers working in public service have only recently been 
able to have their loans forgiven under the PSLF program. The results 
have been shocking: The PSLF program has rejected ninety-nine percent 
of applicants who completed ten years of payments, with the most 
common reason for rejection being that the payments did not count as 
“qualifying payments.”6
According to a recent Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
report, deceptive practices by federal loan servicers have caused some 
borrowers to believe that their loan payments were contributing toward 
forgiveness, when in fact they were not.7 In some situations, servicers 
were aware that borrowers had qualifying public service jobs and did not 
inform those borrowers of their eligibility for PSLF.8 The CFPB report 
tells the story of one borrower who informed his servicer of his intention 
to enroll in PSLF.9 His servicer consolidated his loans for that purpose, 
and when the borrower asked whether he was qualified, the servicer told 
him he was “all set.”10 It was not until four years later that the borrower 
learned that his payments were not counting toward the 120 monthly 
                                                                                                                     
1. Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
20 U.S.C.).
2. Robert Proudfoot, Securitization of Student Loans: A Proposal to Reform Federal 
Accounting, Reduce Government Risk, and Introduce Market Mechanisms as Indicators of 
Quality Education, 9 U. MASS. L. REV. 6, 21–23 (2014).
3. To be more specific, 120 monthly payments, which need not be made on consecutive 
months. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2018).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Public Service Loan Forgiveness Data, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa
/about/data-center/student/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data [https://perma.cc/7QNV-2XVQ] (containing a
March 2019 PSLF report); Zach Friedman, Student Loan Forgiveness Program Rejects 99% of 
Applicants, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2018, 8:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/
2018/09/24/public-service-loan-forgiveness-rejected/#342c71b91824 [https://perma.cc/3RYB-G6K7].
7. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STAYING ON TRACK WHILE GIVING BACK: THE COST OF 




9. Id. at 30.
10. Id.
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payments required for PSLF.11 In a recent class action lawsuit against a 
student loan servicer,12 former professor and meteorologist Bill Cottrill 
describes how he “asked the right questions” about his student loan 
payments.13 Nevertheless, after ten years of payments totaling $130,000, 
Cottrill’s servicer told him that he had the wrong type of loan—it could 
not be forgiven—and now Cottrill must “delay[] retirement another 
decade.”14 Stories like these show that there are clear gaps in the system. 
This Note aims to address how those gaps can be filled.
One of the greatest sources of confusion for borrowers is whether their 
student loans qualify for PSLF.15 In order for a loan payment to count 
toward PSLF, that payment must be for a Direct loan.16 Congress 
implemented Direct loans in 1994 as a replacement for federally 
guaranteed private loans under the Federal Family Education Loans 
(FFEL) program.17 While FFEL loans were discontinued in 2010, 21.6 
million borrowers still owe $437 billion on the program.18 No payments 
toward a FFEL loan count toward PSLF.19 Although a FFEL loan can be 
consolidated into a Direct loan, only subsequent payments under the 
Direct loan will count toward PSLF.20 To complicate matters, the only 
way for a borrower to find out whether his loans are Direct or FFEL is to 
go to the National Student Loan Data System and create a profile; the 
servicers’ websites and billing statements do not contain this 
information.21 So even if a borrower working in public service discovers 
that his loans are under the FFEL program, his only option for loan 
                                                                                                                     
11. Id.
12. Class Action Complaint, Daniel v. Navient Solutions, LLC, No. 8:17-cv-02503 (M.D. 
Fla. Oct. 25, 2017).
13. Jackie Callaway, Navient Accused of Misleading Students About Loan Forgiveness,




15. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 30.
16. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(1)(iii) (2018); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at
29.
17. Terrence L. Michael & Janie M. Phelps, “Judges?! – We Don’t Need No Stinking 
Judges!!!”: The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Cases and the Income Contingent 
Repayment Plan, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 73, 81 (2005).
18. Doug Rendleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of Student Loans: A Critical 
Examination, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 215, 221 (2014).
19. Id. at 232.
20. Id.
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forgiveness is to consolidate the FFEL loans into a Direct loan and restart 
the clock for another ten years of public service.
Although one might argue that it is borrowers’ responsibility to ensure 
that they have the correct type of loan, there are several reasons why the 
law should protect student loan borrowers from their servicers. First of 
all, the increasing requirement of college degrees for entry-level jobs,
combined with the increasing cost of tuition, means that student loans are 
becoming increasingly necessary for young Americans.22 In 2014, 
graduates had an average debt of $29,40023 and studies show that most 
students overestimate their ability to repay their student loans.24 Another 
issue is that during bankruptcy, there is a higher bar25 to discharge student 
loans than other types of loans.26 This is largely due to several highly 
publicized but misrepresentative bankruptcy cases during the early 
1970s, in which recent graduates went on to lucrative careers shortly after 
discharging their student loans in bankruptcy.27 Finally, graduates who 
seek public interest work are at greater financial risk because public 
interest jobs typically have much lower salaries than private sector jobs.28
In fact, the Department of Education has estimated that a college graduate 
working in public service may end up repaying over 170% of their initial 
principal balance.29 This results in a class of borrowers who are under 
                                                                                                                     
22. William J. Cox, The Student Borrower: Slave to the Servicer?, 27 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 189, 195 (2015); Mitch et al., Financial Help Puts Public Interest Careers in Reach, 81 WIS.
LAW. 25, 25 (2008).
23. For law school graduates, the average debt ranges from one and a half to over two times 
as much. L. Kinvin Wroth, Access to Justice: The Problem of Law Student Debt, 30 VT. B.J. 28, 
28 (2004).
24. Cox, supra note 22, at 195–96. In fact, for many Americans, student loan repayment is 
becoming a lifelong endeavor—a CFPB study shows that over the past several years, the number 
of borrowers over the age of sixty with student loan debt has increased in every state and that the 
median debt of those elderly borrowers has increased in nearly every state. CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, OLDER CONSUMERS AND STUDENT LOAN DEBT BY STATE 4–9 (2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/5184/201708_cfpb_older-consumers-and-student-
loan-debt-by-state.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU6H-NDAZ].
25. The Brunner Test, requiring a showing of undue hardship in order to discharge student 
loans, has been “judicially defined too harshly by most of the bankruptcy courts.” Kevin J. Smith, 
Defining the Brunner Test’s Three Parts: Time to Set a National Standard for All Three Parts to 
Determine When to Allow the Discharge of Federal Student Loans, 58 S.D. L. REV. 250, 251 
(2013). However, some studies show that the discharge of student loans through bankruptcy is 
still quite feasible. Jason Iuliano, Student Loans and Surmountable Access-to-Justice Barriers, 68 
FLA. L. REV. 377, 388 (2016). 
26. Kurtis Wiard, Hope for the Hopeless: Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 84 J.
KAN. B. ASS’N 24, 25 (2015).
27. Id.
28. Wroth, supra note 23, at 28 (noting that the average salary for government lawyers is 
less than half that of private practice attorneys).
29. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 26–27.
4
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pressure to take on high amounts of debt with few options to pay it back, 
and who are ripe for exploitation. Student loan servicers are too happy to 
oblige. 
In 2013, the CFPB acknowledged student loan borrowers’ increased 
reports of abuse by servicers by announcing that it would investigate the 
issue.30 According to the director of the CFPB, the agency intended to 
change servicer practices “meant to defraud borrowers” by extending 
oversight to the largest servicers.31 The investigation highlighted several 
concerning issues.32 While servicers have greatly increased the number
of repayment options for borrowers, the change has also resulted in a 
much more complicated and difficult-to-navigate system.33 There is over 
a twenty percent variance in delinquency rates across the repayment plans 
available for federal Direct loans, which shows that getting into the right 
repayment plan is crucial for borrowers.34 However, borrowers report not 
being adequately informed about their options, even when experiencing 
financial hardship.35 For example, some servicers advised borrowers to 
postpone payments through forbearance—which is an attractive short-
term solution, but can make a difficult financial situation worse by 
significantly increasing the amount of unpaid interest—instead of 
informing borrowers about lower repayment options.36 Borrowers further 
report that even when they identify the repayment plan that best fits their 
financial needs to their loan servicers, the servicers sometimes enroll 
them in a different repayment plan.37 Also, over half of borrowers who 
enroll in an income-based repayment plan fail to properly submit the 
annual income documentation requirements,38 which results in severe 
consequences.39 Finally, borrowers are penalized for missing payments 
when they are transferred to a different servicer without notice, or when 
                                                                                                                     
30. Katheryn E. Marcum, Tightening the Loophole: The Role of Fee-Shifting Statutes in 
Resolving the Growing Problem of Servicing America’s Student Loan Debt, 119 W. VA. L. REV.
829, 841–42 (2016). 
31. Id. at 842.
32. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN SERVICING: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC INPUT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 20–38 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201509_cfpb_student-loan-servicing-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/47Y8-SW8K].
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id. at 22–23.
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id. at 25–27.
37. Id. at 27–28.
38. Although this failure is not entirely the fault of the borrower, as will become evident in 
Part III.
39. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 32, at 31–36. For example, when the 
recertification for an income-driven repayment plan is not processed in time, the borrower is billed 
at the much higher standard repayment rate, which can result in interest capitalization, forced
forbearance, and the loss of government subsidies. Id. at 33–35.
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they are told that their loan is in forbearance, but their forbearance 
application is later denied.40
Part of the problem is that student loan servicers often benefit from 
the financial hardship their practices bring upon borrowers. Servicers are 
compensated with a flat monthly fee per account serviced.41 Because 
servicers’ fees do not depend on the level of service given to borrowers, 
“this fee structure may create an economic disincentive to address 
borrower default.”42 So whenever a servicer advises that a borrower go 
into forbearance instead of using an income-adjusted repayment plan, the 
servicer gets easy money for the years that the borrower is in forbearance 
in addition to the money from the increased time it will take the borrower 
to eventually repay the loan, since the borrower will have to pay a greater 
amount after coming out of forbearance.43 Furthermore, servicers “may 
be reluctant to inform borrowers of PSLF” because whenever a borrower 
successfully enrolls in the PSLF program, that borrower is transferred to 
a different, dedicated PSLF servicer.44 The longstanding federal 
regulatory scheme similarly discouraged protective action for borrowers 
for two main reasons.45 First, the same agencies charged with overseeing 
banks also had “a primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of 
the banking system.”46 Second, the regulating agencies made more 
money if they regulated more banks, but the banks were able to choose 
which agency regulated them.47 Thus, regulators who actually enforced 
consumer protection law risked their profitability.48
In response to the recent economic recession and the realization that 
the bank regulatory system did not work, the legislature implemented the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act49 (Dodd-
Frank Act).50 Most notably, the Act created the CFPB and established a 
presumption against preemption.51 The significance of the CFPB is 
evident by the extent of its investigations into student loan servicer 
practices, but it also serves an important function in its authorization to 
                                                                                                                     
40. Id. at 39, 51–52.
41. Id. at 134.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 26.
44. Id. at 44–45.
45. Cox, supra note 22, at 208.
46. Id. at 208 & n.158 (quoting Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 90 (2008)).
47. Id. at 208–09.
48. Id. at 209.
49. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.).
50. Cox, supra note 22, at 214.
51. Id. at 214–15.
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prescribe rules.52 While the CFPB does not have explicit authority over 
student loan servicers, it passed a larger-participant rule in 2014, which 
allows the CFPB to exercise supervisory authority over certain larger 
participants in a market.53 This supervisory authority allows the CFPB to 
regulate large54 student loan servicers engaging in unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts or practices.55
When placed into the greater context of servicers’ abusive treatment 
of student loan borrowers, the problem of misinformed borrowers eligible 
for PSLF but not enrolled in the program is clearly an injustice. As one 
servicer commented in reply to allegations of misleading borrowers, 
“[W]e are on the front lines of repayment every day, so we know how 
complex the federal loan program can be.”56 And yet, servicers blame 
borrowers—most of whom likely have little to no experience with the 
federal loan system—for not servicing errors.57 This is not merely a 
matter of borrowers sleeping on their rights; it is the result of a systematic 
exploitation of vulnerable debtors. Several recent changes have set the 
stage for judicial action against student loan servicers, and with the recent 
ten-year anniversary of the PSLF program, the time is ripe for action.
This Note examines the possible remedies for borrowers who were 
not adequately informed about their eligibility for PSLF. Part I concludes 
that state law claims should not be preempted by the Higher Education 
Act of 1965,58 despite a Ninth Circuit decision holding otherwise. Part II 
evaluates three viable state law remedies. Part III considers unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive acts and practices under Title X of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. Based on the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s reasoning in denying 
a Motion to Dismiss for claims brought against a student loan servicer, it 
is likely that those claims would also be effective at securing PSLF 
remedies.
I. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS
The Dodd-Frank Act’s presumption against preemption is believed to 
be “one of the most important fixes to federal consumer protection 
regulation since the subprime mortgage crisis.”59 Prior to the Act, 
                                                                                                                     
52. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012).
53. Cox, supra note 22, at 218–20.
54. The larger-participant rule gives the CFPB authority over all the government’s servicers 
and two private loan servicers, but not smaller private loan servicers, comprising 29% of the 
student loan market. Id. at 220–21.
55. Id. at 219–20.
56. Callaway, supra note 13.
57. Id.
58. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C.).
59. Cox, supra note 22, at 215.
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banking regulators used preemption to halt state efforts at consumer 
protection.60 Now, the Dodd-Frank Act allows state laws that offer 
greater protection than, or are not inconsistent with, the Act.61 Otherwise, 
the Dodd-Frank Act can only preempt state consumer protection laws if: 
(A) application of a State consumer financial law would 
have a discriminatory effect on national banks, in 
comparison with the effect of the law on a bank chartered by 
that State; 
(B) . . . the State consumer financial law prevents or 
significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank 
of its powers . . . ; or
(C) the State consumer financial law is preempted by a 
provision of Federal law other than title 62 of the Revised 
Statutes.62
However, federal circuit courts have disagreed in the application of 
(C).63 The Ninth Circuit has held that the Higher Education Act of 1965 
preempts state law claims, while the Fourth Circuit has held that it does 
not.64
A. Circuit Split over Preemption
Borrowers who try to bring any state law claims against their servicers
will have to overcome the argument that state law claims are preempted 
by the Higher Education Act, particularly after the Ninth Circuit decision
in Chae v. SLM Corp.65 In Chae, student loan borrowers brought 
California business, contract, and consumer protection claims against 
their loan servicer.66 The Ninth Circuit first determined whether any of 
the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by express preemption.67 Where 
Congress enacts an express preemption, the court’s task is to “interpret 
the provision and ‘identify the domain expressly pre-empted by that
language.’”68 In total, the Ninth Circuit identified that the Higher 
Education Act preempted the operation of state usury laws, statutes of 
limitations, limitations on recovering the costs of debt collection, infancy 
defenses to contract liability, wage garnishment limitations, and 
                                                                                                                     
60. Id. at 209.
61. 12 U.S.C. § 5551(a) (2012); Cox, supra note 22, at 215.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b).
63. Cox, supra note 22, at 215–16.
64. Id. at 216 n.222.
65. 593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010).
66. Id. at 941.
67. Id. at 942.
68. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996)).
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disclosure requirements.69 Of these, the court concluded that the 
preemption of state disclosure requirements barred the plaintiffs’ 
misrepresentation claims.70 In doing so, the court reasoned that “[a]t 
bottom, the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims are improper-disclosure 
claims.”71
Of course, the servicers’ failure to “proactively inform” borrowers 
about PSLF does sound like an improper disclosure claim under the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning.72 However, the express preemption for disclosure 
requirements is limited to “loans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant 
to a program authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 
1965.”73 In contrast, the PSLF program is neither a loan nor authorized 
by the Higher Education Act.74 Indeed, as the Southern District of New 
York observed, “there is nothing in the HEA that standardizes or 
coordinates how a customer service representative of a third-party loan 
servicer like Sallie Mae shall interact with a customer . . . in the day-to-
day servicing of his loan.”75 The remaining challenge for student loan 
borrowers to overcome, and the issue upon which the circuits are split, is 
whether state claims are barred by conflict preemption.
Conflict preemption is derived from the principle that a state law is 
preempted if it creates an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”76 The court determines 
Congress’s objectives by “examining the federal statute as a whole and 
identifying its purpose and intended effects.”77 In Chae, the Ninth Circuit 
evaluated the FFEL program’s explicitly stated purposes and determined 
that the underlying objective was to “make lending to college students a 
less-risky proposition.”78 It further determined that the intended effect of 
the program was uniformity.79 The court primarily attributed the intention 
of uniformity to the “comprehensive framework” of the Act and its 
“precisely-detailed provisions.”80 In connecting the program’s objective 
and purpose, the court observed that “exposure to lawsuits under fifty 
separate sets of laws and court systems could make lenders reluctant to 
                                                                                                                     
69. Id.
70. Id. at 942–43 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1098g).
71. Id. at 942.
72. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 30–32.
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1098g (Supp. V 2018).
74. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2018).
75. Genna v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 11-CV-7371(LBS), 2012 WL 1339482, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 17, 2012). 
76. Chae, 593 F.3d at 943.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 947.
80. Id. at 944.
9
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make new federally-guaranteed student loans.”81 Concluding that the 
application of California consumer protection law would upset the FFEL 
program’s uniformity, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ 
remaining claims were conflict-preempted by the Higher Education 
Act.82
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp.83
was not convinced that uniformity was “actually an important goal of the 
HEA.”84 Instead, the Fourth Circuit focused on the explicitly stated 
purposes of the FFEL program under § 1071(a)(1) of the Higher 
Education Act85:
(A) to encourage States and nonprofit private institutions 
and organizations to establish adequate loan insurance 
programs for students in eligible institutions (as defined in 
section 1085 of this title),
(B) to provide a Federal program of student loan 
insurance for students or lenders who do not have reasonable 
access to a State or private nonprofit program of student loan 
insurance covered by an agreement under section 1078(b) of 
this title,
(C) to pay a portion of the interest on loans to qualified 
students which are insured under this part, and
(D) to guarantee a portion of each loan insured under a 
program of a State or of a nonprofit private institution or 
organization which meets the requirements of section 
1078(a)(1)(B) of this title.86
The Fourth Circuit further did not believe that the mere existence of 
an extensive system of regulations was sufficient to preempt 
nonconflicting state law.87 It cited to the Supreme Court for two important 
propositions. First, “[t]o infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals 
with a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that 
whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field, its regulations will 
be exclusive.”88 Second, “pre-emption is ordinarily not to be implied 
                                                                                                                     
81. Id. at 945 (quoting Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th 
Cir. 1996)).
82. Id. at 950.
83. 396 F.3d 588 (4th Cir. 2005).
84. Id. at 597.
85. Id.
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (2012).
87. College Loan Corp., 396 F.3d at 598.
88. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 
471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985).
10
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absent an ‘actual conflict.’”89 The court concluded that it should not 
“seek[ ] out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none 
clearly exists.”90 Thus, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits disagree about 
whether uniformity was such an important intention of Congress in 
drafting the Higher Education Act that it should preempt state law.
B. Problems with Preemption
No other circuits have weighed in on the issue yet, and thus the 
conflict is largely unresolved. Even though the Fourth Circuit opinion 
was written first and was rebutted by the Ninth Circuit in a much lengthier 
discussion, the Fourth Circuit better adhered to precedent. In fact, the 
Ninth Circuit seems to have blended conflict preemption with field 
preemption. There are three types of preemption: “(1) Congress enacts a 
statute that explicitly pre-empts state law [express preemption]; (2) state 
law actually conflicts with federal law [conflict preemption]; or (3) 
federal law occupies a legislative field to such an extent that it is 
reasonable to conclude that Congress left no room for state regulation in 
that field [field preemption].”91 The Ninth Circuit has held that field 
preemption does not apply to the Higher Education Act, and that field 
preemption is “off the table to resolve this case.”92 Nevertheless, its 
application of conflict preemption seems very similar to field preemption. 
Compare the definition of field preemption above with the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning, in Chae, that Congress intended the Higher Education Act to 
be uniform:
After reviewing the FFELP as a whole, we agree with the 
DOE that Congress intended it to operate uniformly. That 
intent is shown by the comprehensive framework that 
Congress set up to govern the $2 billion per year program. 
The statutes describe the nuts and bolts of the FFELP, 
defining the required terms of each type of loan. The statutes 
go so far as to mandate specified repayment terms and 
specified insurance and guaranty requirements. As one 
example, the FFELP sets the maximum interest rate that a 
lender may charge, depending on the type of loan and the 
date when it was taken out. Such precisely-detailed 
                                                                                                                     
89. Id. (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990)).
90. Id. (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 90).
91. Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tocher v. City of Santa 
Ana, 219 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000)).
92. Id. at 941–42. Other courts have also concluded that the Higher Education Act does not 
occupy the field so as to preempt state claims. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Accrediting Council, 168 
F.3d 1362, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1999), amended, 177 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir.); Morgan v. Markerdowne 
Corp., 976 F. Supp. 301, 318 (D.N.J. 1997).
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provisions show congressional intent that FFELP 
participants be held to clear, uniform standards.93
The Ninth Circuit essentially reasoned that Congress had left no room 
for state regulation in the field, and therefore Congress intended that the 
Higher Education Act be uniform. It then reasoned that any state 
legislation “would threaten [the Department of Education’s] ability to 
carry out the congressional objectives of ensuring uniformity and stability 
within the [Higher Education Act],” and that state law therefore is 
preempted by the Act.94
Indeed, the reasoning in Chae is very similar to the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Hines v. Davidowitz.95 In Hines, the Court concluded that 
because the Alien Registration Act of 1940 was “a single integrated and 
all-embracing system . . . it plainly manifested a purpose to do so in such 
a way as to protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through 
one uniform national registration system,” and any state law was 
therefore preempted.96 However, Hines has been consistently 
characterized as an example of field preemption—not conflict 
preemption.97 Therefore, Chae’s reasoning should be characterized as 
field preemption as well. This is problematic for Chae because of the 
Ninth Circuit’s previous holding that field preemption does not apply to 
the Higher Education Act.98 By reasoning that any state law would 
conflict with Congress’s intention that the Higher Education Act be 
uniform, the Ninth Circuit essentially circumvented its earlier holding 
that field preemption does not apply to the Higher Education Act.
Furthermore, courts do not infer an intent of uniformity merely 
because legislation is comprehensive.99 In Hines, the primary 
consideration was not necessarily the comprehensiveness of the Alien 
Registration Act, but rather the issues it addressed.100 The Court was most 
swayed by the Act’s effects on international relations and human rights, 
both of which the Court recognized to be uniquely suited for federal 
legislation.101 In fact, the field of student loans is less like the field of 
                                                                                                                     
93. Chae, 593 F.3d at 944 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 949.
95. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
96. Id. at 74.
97. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 322 (3rd Cir. 2013).
98. Chae, 593 F.3d at 941–42.
99. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc. 471 U.S. 707, 707 (1985).
100. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67–68.
101. Id. (“And in that determination [of preemption], it is of importance that this legislation 
is in a field which affects international relations, the one aspect of our government that from the 
first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority. . . . And 
it is also of importance that this legislation deals with the rights, liberties, and personal freedoms 
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alien registration and more like that of tax statutes, which the Court 
considered to be “an entirely different category,” presumably unworthy 
of federal preemption.102 Student loans further seem to fall into the 
category of fiduciary responsibilities, for which the Second Circuit 
recognized that “[t]here does not appear to be a pressing need for national 
uniformity.”103 The Second Circuit further did not see “any unreasonable 
burden placed upon union officers required to comply with the fiduciary 
requirements of the various states in which their unions function,”104 in 
contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that uniformity was necessary 
to avoid “exposure to lawsuits under fifty separate sets of laws and court 
systems.”105 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s insistence that the Higher 
Education Act’s comprehensiveness is proof of Congressional intent of 
uniformity may very well be ill-founded.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit does not point to any actual conflict between 
a state law and the Higher Education Act.106 While the servicer in Chae
implemented the Higher Education Act in a way that conflicted with 
California law,107 the Higher Education Act is broad enough that the 
conflict could have been averted. For example, the Higher Education Act 
permits, but does not require, a late fee, while California law prohibits a 
late fee.108 Also, the Higher Education Act allows servicers to set the first 
repayment date up to sixty days after disbursement, while California law 
provides a shorter window.109 Thus, there was no actual conflict because 
it was entirely possible for the servicer to comply with both California 
law and the Higher Education Act. It should be noted that courts apply
two different definitions for conflict preemption: conflict preemption 
exists either where “it is impossible for a private party to comply with 
both state and federal requirements” or where state law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”110 Chae relies on the latter definition, that state 
law is preempted when it is an obstacle to federal law,111 seemingly 
                                                                                                                     
of human beings, and is in an entirely different category from state tax statutes or state pure food 
laws regulating the labels on cans.”).
102. Id.
103. Fitzgerald v. Catherwood, 388 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1968).
104. Id.
105. Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 945 (2010) (quoting Brannan v. United Student Aid 
Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
106. See generally Chae, 593 F.3d 936.
107. Id. at 940–41.
108. Id. at 947.
109. Id. at 947–48.
110. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
111. Chae, 593 F.3d at 943.
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because it was not impossible for the student loan servicer to comply with 
both state and federal requirements. The issue with this is that the 
“obstacle” language traces back to Hines, in which the Supreme Court 
was actually discussing field preemption.112 The position that obstacle 
preemption is not in fact conflict preemption is consistent with how the 
Supreme Court has “observed repeatedly that pre-emption is ordinarily 
not to be implied absent an ‘actual conflict.’”113 An actual conflict should 
mean one that makes it impossible to comply with both state and federal 
law, not merely one that creates an obstacle in doing so. Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit’s entire analysis, from establishing a congressional intent of 
uniformity to finding California state law to be an obstacle to that intent, 
uses the term conflict preemption while actually using the language and 
analysis of field preemption. Because field preemption does not apply to 
the HEA, Chae, or any case determined on similar grounds, it should not 
justify the preemption of state law remedies to aggrieved student loan 
debtors unless it is actually impossible for the loan servicer to comply 
with both federal and state laws.
II. STATE LAW CLAIMS
With the issue of preemption resolved, this Note now turns to potential 
remedies for borrowers who were misled by their servicers into making 
years of payments that did not count toward PSLF. 
A. Negligent or Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Borrowers who were told that their student loans payments were 
eligible for PSLF when they in fact were not may have either a negligent 
or fraudulent misrepresentation claim, or both. The elements for these 
misrepresentations are “essentially the same,” with the only difference 
being the scienter requirement.114 Fraudulent misrepresentation requires 
“the representor’s knowledge that the representation is false,” while 
negligent misrepresentation instead requires that the representor 
“reasonably should have known of the statement’s falsity.”115 Including 
the scienter requirement, there are four elements for each claim: “(1) a 
                                                                                                                     
112. Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–68 (“And in that determination [of whether Pennsylvania’s law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress”], it is of importance that this legislation is in a field which affects international 
relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally conceded 
imperatively to demand broad national authority.”).
113. English, 496 U.S. at 90.
114. Rogers v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1312 (N.D. Fla. 2003) (applying 
Florida law).
115. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Elders v. United Methodist Church, 793 So. 2d 1038, 
1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)).
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false statement concerning a material fact; (2) [the scienter requirement]; 
(3) an intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and (4) 
consequent injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation.”116
Florida courts have acknowledged the possibility that the plaintiff’s 
detrimental reliance could be either an action or refraining from action.117
As a tort claim, negligent misrepresentation would be subject to a defense 
of contributory fault if the court determined that the borrower was also 
negligent in causing the harm.118 However, due to the complexity of 
modern student loan payment options,119 it seems difficult to fault the 
borrower for relying on his servicer. Finally, the statute of limitations for 
negligent misrepresentation in Florida is subject to the delayed discovery 
doctrine, meaning that the limitation period does not begin to run until 
“the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should 
have been discovered.”120
The success of a negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation claim 
would likely depend on the specific fact pattern of the student loan 
servicers’ PSLF practices. For instance, the situation in which a servicer 
affirmatively told the borrower that her payments qualified for the loan 
forgiveness program121 would make a strong fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim. First, there is clearly a false statement—whether 
the borrower’s repayments qualified for PSLF—of material fact. Second, 
it seems likely that the borrower would be able to prove that his servicer 
knew the status of his loan payment, and almost a certainty that the 
servicer should have known the status of the borrower’s loan payment. 
And while courts do not tend to focus on the third element, student loan 
servicers clearly have an incentive to keep borrowers off of PSLF, 
because doing so greatly increases their own income.122 Finally, any 
                                                                                                                     
116. Id. (quoting Elders, 793 So. 2d at 1042).
117. Id. (“One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation . . . for the purpose of inducing 
another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability . . . .” (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977))).
118. Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 696 So. 2d 334, 338 (adopting the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts’ position). 
119. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 32, at 20 (“We service loans made under an 
increasingly complex student loan program. Since 1990, the number of repayment options 
available to borrowers has increased from two to 15—including multiple income-driven 
repayment plans with similar sounding names and differing eligibility criteria. There are now 
eight forgiveness programs and over 35 different deferment and forbearance options.”).
120. Mayor’s Jewelers, Inc. v. Meyrowitz, No. 12–80055–CIV, 2012 WL 2344609, at *4–5
(S.D. Fla. June 20, 2012) (applying Florida law). In Florida, the delayed discovery rule applies to 
actions “founded upon fraud,” and for this purpose, negligent misrepresentation “sounds in fraud 
rather than negligence.” Id.
121. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 30; see supra text accompanying notes 
9–11.
122. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 32, at 44–45.
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reasonable borrower, upon hearing that she was “all set,” would likely 
rely on that information in deciding that no further action is necessary.123
While negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation may not be as likely to 
succeed in a fact pattern where the servicer neglected to inform a 
borrower about his payments’ ineligibility for PSLF, it is a strong option 
for borrowers who were told that their payments were PSLF eligible. In 
any case, the statute of limitations should not be an issue because even if 
the borrower spent years making payments that were not PSLF 
eligible,124 the limitation period would only begin once the borrower 
realized that his servicer had deceived him.125
B. Unjust Enrichment
Another possible theory of recovery against student loan servicers is 
that the servicers are being unjustly enriched by payments that do not 
count toward PSLF. Unjust enrichment is “an equitable claim based on a 
legal fiction which implies a contract as a matter of law” even though no 
actual contract exists between the parties.126 Indeed, a claim for unjust 
enrichment is precluded where an express contract already exists on the 
same subject matter, for the proper claim would be one for breach of 
contract.127 The FFEL loan Master Promissory Note permissively 
allowed the borrower to consolidate his loan into a Direct Loan “to take 
advantage of the public service loan forgiveness program,” but it did not
guarantee that the servicer would ensure that qualifying borrowers did
so.128 Thus, while a borrower may want to bring a breach of contract 
claim in the alternative, the better cause of action likely lies with unjust 
enrichment. The elements for an unjust enrichment claim are: “(1)
plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) defendant voluntarily 
accepted and retained the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for 
                                                                                                                     
123. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 30.
124. A fact pattern described in the 2017 CFPB report. Id. at 29–30.
125. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
126. 14th & Heinberg, LLC v. Terhaar & Cronley Gen. Contractors, Inc., 43 So. 3d 877, 880 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2010). 
127. GTP Structures I, LLC v. Wisper II, LLC, 153 F. Supp. 3d 983, 992 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) 
(quoting Diamond “S” Dev. Corp. v. Mercantile Bank, 989 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)) 
(applying Florida law).
128. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OMB NO. 1845-0069, FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN 
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defendant to retain the benefit without paying the value of the benefit to 
plaintiff.”129 Each element will be discussed in turn.
In order to satisfy the first element, student loan borrowers have to 
show that they conferred a benefit upon student loan servicers. While 
borrowers should have to make only 120 monthly payments before their 
loans are forgiven under the PSLF program, if borrowers were misled by 
their servicer, any payments that did not qualify for PSLF do not count 
toward the required 120 monthly payments. When a student loan 
borrower—who is otherwise eligible for PSLF—is misled into believing 
that his payments qualified for PSLF, he confers a benefit upon his 
servicer when he makes any payment after the 120th monthly payment.
Florida courts also emphasize that the plaintiff must directly confer the 
benefit to the defendant.130 The benefit is not direct, for example, where 
the plaintiff confers a benefit to the defendant’s subsidiary company or 
to a corporation in which the defendant has two-thirds ownership, even 
though the defendant receives a portion of that benefit.131 In this situation, 
student loan servicers should be a direct beneficiary of loan repayments,
even though some servicers act on behalf of another lender.132
As for the second element, it should be easy to show that servicers 
knowingly accepted the benefit by simply providing the billing 
information for any payments after the 120th monthly payment. For the 
third and final element, borrowers have to show that servicers’ practices 
of receiving more than 120 monthly payments from PSLF-eligible 
borrowers is unjust unless those borrowers are compensated. The unjust 
enrichment claim will fail on this element if the defendant has “given 
adequate consideration to someone for the benefit conferred.”133
However, it seems apparent that in the posed situation, borrowers receive 
no compensation at all for the excess loan payments they have to pay due 
to servicers’ misleading practices. After all, if not for the misleading 
practices, borrowers would have completely wiped out their student loan 
debt after the 120th payment; any additional money that borrowers have 
                                                                                                                     
129. Johnson v. Catamaran Health Sols., LLC, 687 F. App’x 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing 
Fito v. Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 83 So. 3d 755, 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)) (applying Florida 
law).
130. Kopel v. Kopel, 229 So. 3d 812, 118 (Fla. 2017).
131. Catamaran Health Sols., 687 F. App’x at 830 (applying Florida law); Kopel v. Kopel, 
117 So. 3d 1147, 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 229 So. 3d 812.
132. While the holder of a loan and the servicer of a loan can be two different entities, the 
two largest holders of FFEL loans, Navient and Nelnet, are also both loan servicers. Top 100 
Current Holders of FFELP Loans for 2017 and 2016, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://fp.ed.gov/attachments/publications/FY2017Top100Lenders.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJC8-
4G8H].
133. Am. Safety Ins. Serv. v. Griggs, 959 So. 2d 322, 331–32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
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to spend toward that debt is purely money lost to borrowers and money 
gained by servicers.
With all three elements satisfied, borrowers should be able to receive 
damages for the benefit unjustly conferred upon student loan servicers. 
These damages are “measured in terms of the benefit to the owner, not
the cost to the provider.”134 The benefit to the student loan servicer will 
depend on whether the servicer is also the lender of the loan. In either 
situation, the servicer always receives a flat rate from the government.135
But where the servicer also holds the loan as a lender, the lender receives 
the additional benefit of the entire principal repayment of the loan plus 
interest subsidies from the government.136 Thus, under unjust enrichment, 
borrowers could potentially receive more in damages than the amount of 
money they lost in excess payments, but only if their loan servicer is also 
the holder of the loan. If the loan servicer is a different entity from the 
holder of the loan, courts may be concerned about the potential for the 
plaintiff receiving a windfall through double recovery,137 and thus the 
proper course of action may be to bring in the lender as a defendant.
Unjust enrichment has a statute of limitations of four years,138 and 
because the unjust enrichment in this scenario occurs with each payment 
after the 120th monthly payment, most borrowers should have no 
difficulty being within the limitation period. One potential issue with this 
theory of recovery is that it only recognizes harm as payments after the 
120th monthly payment—each earlier payment would not be unjust 
enrichment because the borrower intended to make 120 monthly 
payments under the PSLF program. Thus, borrowers who are aware that 
they have been deceived by their servicers and have since consolidated 
their loan into a Direct loan may have to wait until they have made 120 
monthly payments after consolidation before bringing this cause of 
action.
                                                                                                                     
134. Kane v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A., 85 So. 3d 1112, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2012) (quoting Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL, 198 F.3d 802, 806 (11th Cir. 1999)).
135. While the flat rate is quite low for individual borrowers—2.85 dollars per month per 
borrower—this could still contribute a substantial amount to damages in a class action suit with 
many borrowers who each enriched their servicer for many years. Issue Primers Federal Student 
Loan Financing, PNPI (July 9, 2018), http://pnpi.org/federal-student-loan-servicing/ 
[https://perma.cc/WVA9-MJYS].
136. 2010 U.S. DEP’T EDUC. ECASLA ANN. REP. 9, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/
default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/June2010ECASLAReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVA9-
MJYS] (describing how the government “no longer pays lenders default and interest rate subsidies 
for these loans” after it purchases the loans from the lender).
137. Engelke v. Athel-Tech Comp. Sys., Inc., 982 So. 2d 3, 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
138. Beltran v. Vincent P. Miraglia, M.D., P.A., 125 So. 3d 855, 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 3 [], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss3/5
2019] REMEDIES FOR STUDENT LOAN DEBTORS IN PUBLIC SERVICE 907
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claims against student loan servicers for breach of fiduciary duty have 
not been widely successful.139 The elements of a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty are “the existence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach of 
that duty such that it is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages.”140
The issue for student loan borrowers bringing breach of fiduciary duty 
claims against their servicers is that generally, a fiduciary relationship 
does not exist between a lender and a borrower.141 Despite the general 
rule, a fiduciary relationship can be “based upon trust or confidence by 
one person in the integrity and fidelity of another.”142 Under Florida law, 
“the principle of fiduciary duty ‘extends to every possible case in which 
a fiduciary relation exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed 
on one side and the resulting superiority and influence on the other.’”143
This flexibility of definition is expanded by the court’s acknowledgement 
of implied fiduciary duty.144
An implied fiduciary duty “is based on the circumstances surrounding 
the transaction and the relationship of the parties,”145 and may be found 
when “confidence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by the 
other.”146 Thus, if a student loan servicer exhibited confidence in its 
ability to help a borrower and the borrower indicated his trust in the 
servicer, the servicer may actually have an implied fiduciary duty to the 
borrower. Unfortunately, the conversations between borrower and 
servicer that could have created such a duty would have happened years 
ago in many cases, and it is unlikely that most borrowers would have 
created and kept a recording. Nevertheless, a borrower is much more 
likely to succeed on a theory of breach of implied fiduciary duty by 
                                                                                                                     
139. E.g., Ikeri v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. CV 13-1943 (DSD/JSM), 2014 WL 12599634, at *16
(D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2014); Genna v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7371 (LBS), 2012 WL 1339482, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2012).
140. Patten v. Winderman, 965 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Gracey v. 
Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002)).
141. Genna, 2012 WL 1339482, at *4 (citing Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Block 3102 Corp., 
580 N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Div. 1992)); Bank Leumi, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (“The legal relationship 
between a borrower and a bank is a contractual one of debtor and creditor and does not create a 
fiduciary relationship between the bank and its borrower or its guarantors.”).
142. Genna, 2012 WL 1339482, at *4 (quoting Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 
(App. Div. 1976)).
143. Fla. Bar v. Adorno, 60 So. 3d 1016, 1027–28 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Quinn v. Phipps, 113 
So. 419, 421 (Fla. 1927)).
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Maxwell v. First United Bank, 782 So. 2d 931, 933–34 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2001)).
146. Maxwell, 782 So. 2d at 933–34 (quoting Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc., 644 So. 2d 515, 
518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)).
19
Goring: Forgotten But Not Forgiven: Remedies for Student Loan Debtors in
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
908 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
alleging an exchange of confidence and trust, rather than making a 
general allegation of breach of fiduciary duty.
The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty is four years, 
starting when the last element of the cause of action occurs.147 While 
some borrowers may be able to bring an action against their servicer 
within four years, this is only a small portion of the ten years that a 
borrower may have continued making payments under the impression 
that their payments counted toward PSLF. There may, however, be an 
argument that could extend the statute of limitations. Courts differ as to 
whether the last element of the cause of action for breach of fiduciary 
duty is the breach itself or damage caused by that breach.148 Because the 
statute of limitations is based on when the last element occurs and 
because there is a large gap between when the breach occurs and when 
damages occur, this ambiguity is significant. If the last element of the 
claim, and thus the start of the limitation period, is in fact the damages
caused by the breach, borrowers could argue that the damages do not 
occur until the borrower has completed the 120 monthly payments—the
point at which the loan should have been forgiven. Nevertheless, breach 
of fiduciary duty remains a difficult cause of action to bring.
III. UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES
The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or 
practices, which offers a potential recourse for victimized borrowers.149
While the Act does not create a private right of action that borrowers 
could bring, the CFPB regularly brings actions on consumers’ behalf.150
Notably, in January 2017 the CFPB filed action against Navient, one of 
the main federal student loan servicers, for violating Title X of the Dodd-
Frank Act, also known as the Consumer Financial Protection (CFP) 
Act.151 The Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Navient’s motion to 
dismiss, finding, among other things, that the CFPB had the authority to 
bring the action and that it sufficiently pleaded Navient’s violations of 
                                                                                                                     
147. Davis v. Monahan, 832 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 2002); Woodward v. Woodward, 192 So. 
3d 528, 531 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); see also Patten v. Winderman, 965 So. 2d 1222, 1224–25 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2007) (explaining that breach of fiduciary duty is not subject to the delayed discovery 
doctrine).
148. Compare Minotty v. Baudo, 42 So. 3d 824, 835–36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing Gracey 
v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002)) (listing damages as a third element of the claim), with
Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 353 (listing breach as the second and final element of the claim, though 
including within this element that the breach must result in damages). 
149. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012).
150. Simpson v. Xerox Educ. Serv., LLC, No. 3:17-CV-00076-JHM, 2017 WL 6507654, at 
*2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2017).
151. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530, at 
*1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017).
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the Dodd-Frank Act.152 The CFPB’s preliminary success in Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau v. Navient Corp.153 is therefore an 
indication that harm to student loan debtors who are working in public 
service but not enrolled in the PSLF program may have a remedy through
the CFPB alleging unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices. While 
the Navient court did not directly contemplate servicers’ PSLF practices, 
its analysis provides a useful framework for discussing unfair, deceptive, 
and abusive acts or practices in the PSLF context.
A. Abusive Acts or Practices
The CFPB’s first count against Navient was for abusive acts, and the 
facts of this count most closely parallel servicers’ PSLF practices.154 The 
complaint alleged that Navient advertised its ability to help borrowers 
choose the best repayment plan for their individual needs, but “instead 
steered borrowers into forbearance without adequately advising them 
about other repayment options.”155 It is true that forbearance can be a 
useful option for borrowers; forbearance offers a temporary reprieve from 
payments156 and can thus be well-suited for situations such as that of a
borrower who is temporarily in between jobs. However, interest 
continues to accrue during the forbearance period, and if it goes on for 
long enough the interest will capitalize, increasing the principal.157 This 
means that when a borrower in forbearance resumes payments, the 
monthly payment will likely be larger, and there could be “a significant 
increase in the total amount he or she must ultimately pay back.”158
Because of the drawbacks to forbearance, a borrower in long-term 
financial hardship would be better served with an income-driven 
repayment plan.159
Income-driven repayment plans take into account several factors to 
calculate an affordable monthly payment—even one as low as $0 per 
month.160 However, developing an income-based repayment plan for a 
borrower is a much longer and more complicated process than simply 
putting the borrower into forbearance, and Navient incentivizes its 
employees to make phone calls with borrowers as short as possible.161
                                                                                                                     
152. Id. at *9, *25.
153. No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017).
154. Id. at *19.
155. Id.
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This practice resulted in an outcome one might expect: Navient “routinely 
entered financially distressed borrowers into forbearance without 
adequately discussing—or sometimes discussing at all—the option of 
income-driven repayment plans.”162 Despite the numerous advantages of 
income-driven repayment plans over forbearance, the number of 
Navient’s borrowers in forbearance exceeded those in income-driven 
repayment plans.163 The disregard for Navient’s borrowers’ financial 
well-being stands in stark contrast to the representations on Navient’s 
website—that it could help borrowers make the right decision for their 
situation.164 According to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the 
CFPB’s Complaint alleged sufficient facts for a count of abusive acts or 
practices to survive Navient’s Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).165
There are two ways for an act or practice to be determined abusive 
under the Dodd-Frank Act. First, the act or practice is abusive if it 
“materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term 
or condition of a consumer financial product or service.”166 Second, the 
act or practice is abusive if it takes unreasonable advantage of:
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of 
the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or 
service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of 
the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial 
product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered 
person to act in the interests of the consumer.167
The CFPB relied on 2(C), unreasonable advantage of reasonable 
reliance, in its case against Navient.168 The court noted the CFPB’s 
allegations that Navient took unreasonable advantage of that reliance by 
failing to “give complete information on income-driven repayment plans 
and instead push[ing] borrowers into forbearance,” which was “both 
detrimental to borrowers and beneficial to Navient.”169 The court was 
satisfied with the CFPB’s allegations that borrowers reasonably relied on 
                                                                                                                     
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *1, *19.
165. Id. at *19–20.
166. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(1) (2012).
167. Id. § 5531(d)(2).
168. Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *19.
169. Id.
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Navient to act in their interests based on the representations on Navient’s 
website and its invitation for borrowers to contact them for help,170
regardless of whether Navient had any legal duty to provide 
individualized financial counseling to borrowers.171 As the court 
observed, the Dodd-Frank Act does not state that duty is an element of 
abusive act or practice.172 After all, reasonable reliance does not 
necessarily come from a preexisting legal duty.173 Therefore, as long as a 
borrower’s reliance on a loan servicer is reasonable, any act that takes 
unreasonable advantage of that reliance could qualify as an abusive act.174
According to the court, the CFPB’s allegations were sufficient at the 
pleading stage to allege an abusive act or practice.175
The similarities between Navient’s forbearance practices and 
servicers’ PSLF practices described in the CFPB report are persuasive 
that the law should apply to them similarly. The CFPB reported that after 
borrowers communicated to their servicer that they worked in public 
service, servicers “withh[e]ld essential information about eligibility for 
PSLF.”176 Further, some borrowers informed their servicer of their 
intention to pursue PSLF, only for their servicer to place them into a 
nonqualifying repayment plan.177 The consequences of servicers’ actions 
were the years that borrowers paid into a nonqualifying repayment plan 
and the increased costs of doing so.178 Therefore, in both the PSLF 
context and in the CFPB’s suit against Navient, servicers failed to 
proactively inform borrowers about an option that would have 
significantly improved their financial situations.
The CFPB’s action against Navient and the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania’s denial of Navient’s Motion to Dismiss lays the 
groundwork for potential abusive practices claims against servicers for 
PSLF practices. If a servicer made positive representations about its 
ability to help borrowers choose an appropriate repayment plan, the 
CFPB should be able to show that the borrowers reasonably relied on 
their servicer to act in their interests. From there, borrowers must also be 
able to show that their servicer took unreasonable advantage of their 
reliance. If failing to inform borrowers about a more suitable income-
driven repayment plan constitutes taking unreasonable advantage of 
                                                                                                                     
170. Id. at *19–20.
171. Id.
172. Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
173. Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *19–20 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 90 (AM. LAW INST. 2017)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, 29–30.
177. Id. at 33.
178. Id. at 29–33.
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borrowers, then failing to inform them about their eligibility for the PSLF 
program should as well. The CFPB took note that not putting a borrower 
on a suitable income-driven repayment plan was detrimental to the 
borrower and beneficial to Navient,179 and the same is true for not 
informing a borrower about the PSLF program. After all, a servicer loses 
money whenever a borrower is placed into PSLF because “doing so 
currently leads to the loan being reassigned to a specialty server.”180 And 
it seems clear that the borrower’s loss of access to loan forgiveness causes 
significant financial harm. Therefore, the CFPB should have a strong 
case, on behalf of borrowers who were not informed about their eligibility 
for PSLF, against servicers under 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) for abusive acts or 
practices.
B. Unfair Acts or Practices
The CFPB’s second and third counts against Navient were for unfair 
acts or practices, using both the same facts as the first count as well as 
additional information about Navient’s failure to adequately notify 
borrowers about necessary paperwork.181 Under the income-driven 
repayment plans, borrowers must submit renewal paperwork annually.182
Although failure to submit this paperwork results in potentially 
irreversible consequences for borrowers, Navient’s notice to borrowers 
about the deadline, both through email and nonelectronic mail, did not 
fully inform borrowers as to what was required of them.183 The emails 
had a subject line of either “Your Sallie Mae Account Information” or 
“New Document Ready to View,” and the body of the email simply stated 
that “a new education loan document is available. Please log in to your 
account to view it,” and contained a hyperlink to Navient’s website. The 
nonelectronic mail informed borrowers that their income-driven 
repayment plan would “expire in approximately 90 days” and that the 
“renewal process may take at least 30 days.”184 The Middle District of 
Pennsylvania determined that under both Navient’s forbearance practices 
(from Count I) and its notice practices, the CFPB adequately pleaded a 
claim for unfair acts or practices.185
                                                                                                                     
179. Id.
180. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 32, at 46.
181. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530, at 
*20, *21 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017).
182. Id. at *2.
183. Id. at *2–3.
184. Id. at *3.
185. Id. at *20–23.
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There is a two-part test to determine whether an act or practice is 
unfair under the Dodd-Frank Act.186 First, “the act or practice causes or 
is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers.”187 Second, “such substantial injury is not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”188 An injury is reasonably avoidable if “consumers had a 
free and informed choice.”189 With both Navient’s forbearance practices 
and its notice practices, the court found that the CFPB’s allegations, if 
true, meant that borrowers would be unlikely to know that they needed to 
seek information beyond what their servicer told them either by phone, 
mail, or email.190 Thus, while consumers may have had a free choice, the 
choice was not informed, and thus the injury was likely not reasonably 
avoidable.
Based on this standard and with the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s 
analysis as guidance, the CFPB would also likely succeed on a claim that 
servicers’ PSLF practices are unfair. First, the CFPB should have little 
difficulty in proving that the practice of not informing borrowers about 
their PSLF eligibility is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers. 
Just like Navient’s forbearance and notice practices, servicers’ PSLF 
practices can have permanent consequences on borrowers by increasing 
the total amount they must pay toward their loan. Also, the reasonable 
avoidability of this harm is analogous to that of both Navient’s 
forbearance and notice practices: because borrowers do not have a free 
and informed choice where a servicer fails to inform them of their 
eligibility for PSLF based on their repayment plan, the harm of losing out 
on PSLF payments was not reasonably avoidable. Second, it seems clear 
that there are no countervailing benefits to consumers or competition by 
not informing borrowers about their PSLF eligibility. PSLF encourages 
college graduates to serve the public good in lower paying jobs. 
Preventing graduates from accessing the compensation for this service 
that Congress provided has no public benefit. Therefore, the CFPB should 
have a good chance at succeeding on an unfair acts or practices claim 
against servicers on the behalf of public service workers who were not 
informed about their PSLF eligibility.
                                                                                                                     
186. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (2012).
187. Id. § 5531(c)(1)(A).
188. Id. § 5531(c)(1)(B).
189. Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *21 (quoting FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1158 
(9th Cir. 2010)).
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C. Deceptive Acts or Practices
Finally, the CFPB’s complaint also alleged several counts of 
deceptive acts or practices.191 One count was for the mailed notices about 
the renewal paperwork for income-driven repayment plans, which stated 
that incorrect or incomplete information would result in a delay, “and thus 
implied that delay was the only consequence of submitting incorrect or 
incomplete information, when in truth it could have several irreversible 
consequences.”192 The remaining counts alleged that Navient informed 
defaulting borrowers that the federal loan rehabilitation program would 
reduce the consequences of default more than the program actually did.193
While the Dodd-Frank Act clearly defines the criteria for abusive and 
unfair acts, it does not define any criteria for a deceptive act.194 Instead, 
courts evaluating deceptive practices under the Dodd-Frank Act apply the 
test used for deceptive acts under the Federal Trade Commission Act.195
According to this test, an act or practice is deceptive if: “(1) ‘there is a 
representation, omission, or practice that,’ (2) ‘is likely to mislead 
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances,’ and (3) ‘the 
representation, omission, or practice is material.’”196 Courts consider 
deception based on the “net impression” a representation has on the 
consumer.197 Applying this test, the Middle District of Pennsylvania was 
able to determine that Navient’s practice of “creat[ing] a false impression
that a processing delay was the only adverse consequence of filing an 
incomplete or inaccurate application[]” was a sufficient pleading for a 
deceptive act.198 And although circuits are split on the issue of whether 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement 
for allegations of fraud or mistake applies to allegations of a deceptive 
act,199 the Eleventh Circuit has not weighed in on the issue.200
                                                                                                                     
191. Id. at *23–26.
192. Id. at *23.
193. Id. at *24.
194. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012); Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *23.
195. Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *23 (citing Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 
F.3d 1179, 1193 n.7 (9th Cir. 2016)).
196. Id. (quoting Gordon, 819 F.3d at 1192–93).
197. Id. (quoting Gordon, 819 F.3d at 1193).
198. Id. at *23–24.
199. The 9th Circuit has expanded Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard to claims in 
which fraud is not an element, reasoning that using the word deceptive instead of fraud did “not 
detract from the apparently fraudulent nature of the allegations.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. 
Prime Mktg. Holdings, LLC, No. CV1607111-BRO (JEMX), 2016 WL 10516097, at *5 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 15, 2016) (quoting FTC v. Lights of Am., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (C.D. Cal. 
2010)). On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit and some district courts more strictly limit 9(b) to 
fraud. Navient, 2017 WL 3380530, at *24–25; Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna 
& Assoc., P.C., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1371–74 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
200. Frederick J. Hanna & Assoc., 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1371–72. 
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According to the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s analysis, the 
CFPB should also be able to make a successful claim that student loan 
servicers engaged in deceptive acts or practices. As the CFPB report 
indicated, loan servicers led borrowers to believe that their payments 
were eligible for PSLF, when they in fact were not.201 The net impression 
of the servicers’ representation was that borrowers working in public 
service jobs only needed to continue making their loan payments for 120 
months in order for their loans to be forgiven. It logically follows that a 
borrower acting reasonably under the circumstances would continue 
making loan payments. However, that borrower would be misled, 
because the borrower would in fact have to consolidate his loan into a 
Direct loan in order for his payments to be PSLF eligible.202 Also, the 
misleading would be material, because it has great impact on the 
decisions the borrower makes.203
Therefore, servicers’ PSLF practices should meet all three factors of 
the test for deceptive acts or practices.204
D. Statute of Limitations
The CFPB’s final hurdle in bringing action against student loan 
servicers for the violation of the Dodd-Frank Act is that the claims must 
be within the statute of limitations. The law on this matter is explicit: 
“Except as otherwise permitted by law or equity, no action may be 
brought under this title more than 3 years after the date of discovery of 
the violation to which an action relates.”205 The 3-year limitation period 
does not start at the “mere receipt of a consumer complaint.”206 Rather, 
such a consumer complaint would only put the CFPB on inquiry notice 
that it should investigate the matter for a possible violation.207 The 
limitation period begins when the CFPB discovers “the facts constituting 
the violation.”208 It is unclear from the CFPB’s reports exactly when it 
discovered the facts constituting student loan servicers’ unfair, deceptive, 
and abusive acts or practices; however, it seems likely that the CFPB was 
                                                                                                                     
201. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7.
202. Id. at 29.
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aware of the facts by time it published them in its June 2017 report.209
While the CFPB has been less aggressive under its recent leadership,210
time remains to see whether the CFPB will act on the PSLF issues raised 
in its reports. Furthermore, the CFPB may have an argument that its 
statute of limitations has only began to run more recently based on the 
discovery of new facts.
CONCLUSION
The Public Service Loan Forgiveness program offered much-needed 
relief to a class of borrowers who put public service ahead of their own 
financial needs. While a complete forgiveness of loans, regardless of their 
value, is generous, borrowers who decided to pursue PSLF made a huge 
commitment: ten years of public service. For a borrower who has worked 
for years with the understanding that his loans would be forgiven after 
the 120th monthly payment, the realization that his payments were not in 
fact PSLF eligible would be devastating. And yet, because of the 
practices of student loan servicers, this exact scenario is unfolding across 
the country. With only one percent of applications for loan forgiveness 
being approved, the problem is obvious, and initial litigation is already 
laying the ground for a continued increase in litigation against student 
loan servicers. 
For borrowers wanting to bring action against their student loan 
servicer, the first step will be overcoming an argument of federal 
preemption. Despite a Ninth Circuit holding to the contrary, precedent 
best supports the conclusion that the Higher Education Act does not 
preempt state law claims against student loan servicers. While no court 
has considered whether there is a valid cause of action against student 
loan servicers for their PSLF practices, there are at least three causes of 
action that could succeed under Florida law. Harm through 
misinformation seems to best fall under fraudulent misrepresentation, 
and, indeed, that might be the strongest cause of action available to 
borrowers. There is also a compelling argument that servicers are unjustly 
enriched by their actions, although courts may be skeptical of the idea 
that a doctrine originating in property law should apply to loan payments 
spanning several years. Finally, even though courts have consistently 
found that loan servicers do not owe borrowers a fiduciary duty, courts 
may be amenable to recovery under breach of implied fiduciary duty. 
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Alternatively, while the Consumer Financial Protection Act does not 
give borrowers a private right of action, it does give the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau a potent cause of action against student loan 
servicers. Not only do the elements for unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts 
or practices align very closely to servicers’ PSLF practices, but the CFPB 
has already had preliminary success against a student loan servicer on a 
very similar fact pattern. States are already starting to bring actions 
against student loan servicers based on state-law claims that closely 
resemble the Dodd-Frank Act,211 thus broadening the avenues for justice.
Unless Congress takes action to protect student loan borrowers,212 only 
litigation can allow borrowers turn back the clock on their student loan 
payments and receive the forgiveness that they deserve. 
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